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Abstract
Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often
substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a
given research question. A proponent of methodological triangula-
tion believes that if multiple methods yield the same answer that an-
swer is confirmed more strongly than it could have been by any single
method. Methodological purists, on the other hand, believe that one
should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using
formal tools from voting theory, we show that triangulation is more
likely to lead to the correct answer than purism, assuming the scien-
tist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of
the various methods. This is true even when in fact only one of the
methods is appropriate for the given research question.
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1 Introduction
Methodological pluralism is an entrenched fact of life for the working social
scientist. There exist a variety of different methods of carrying out social
scientific work which are actually applied in the course of various research
projects. While the contrast between quantitative and qualitative methods
is the most striking, depending on how one individuates methods one can
find methodological difference within as well as between those categories.
For instance, ethnographic participant observation and hermeneutic textual
analysis are distinct yet equally qualitative methods, whereas Bayesian and
frequentist statistics provide different methods of running quantitive analysis.
It is not clear whether the fact of methodological pluralism is benefi-
cial to social science. One optimistic response is to consider strategies for
exploiting methodological pluralism to bolster the reliability of results ob-
tained in the social sciences. To advocate this is to advocate what has come
to be called “methodological triangulation”. The idea behind methodologi-
cal triangulation is that the convergence of multiple methods upon a single
conclusion better supports that conclusion than just one of those methods
arriving at the conclusion. Against this, however, pessimists might think
that methodological pluralism is both a result and a source of confusion in
the social sciences, and thus be unmoved by the advocacy of triangulation.
After all, somebody who deduces that 2 + 2 = 4 need not have their con-
fidence bolstered by the fact that somebody who says that the sum of any
two numbers is 4 has converged on the same answer as them in this case.
Nor should they be concerned by their lack of triangulation with the per-
son who always says “5”. To somebody who sees methodological pluralism
as arising from widespread methodological error, quite why methodological
triangulation should be beneficial may thus remain opaque.
There is indeed a persistent vein of scepticism about methodological tri-
angulation running through the literature. A class of theorists we term
“methodological purists” argue that in order to understand any given phe-
nomenon there is one method that should be used at the exclusion of others
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(McEvoy and Richards 2006, p. 68). There are, typically, two sorts of ar-
guments for this. The first is that different methods are often based on
such wildly different presuppositions that any attempt to combine them can
only lead to mischief or confusion. Kelle summarised this view as follows:
“[r]esearch methods are often developed within differing research traditions
carrying varying epistemological and theoretical assumptions with them.
Thus the combination of methods... [will] not lead to more valid results”
(Kelle 2005, p. 99; see also Blaikie 1991, p. 115, and Sim and Sharp 1998,
p. 27). Sim and Sharp (1998, p. 26) claim that to avoid issues such as this one
would have to decide in favour of one method and its accompanying theory.
Since the fact of methodological pluralism in the social sciences is partially
the result of theorists being unable to decide which paradigm to adopt, this
would not bode well for methodological triangulation. The second sort of
argument rests upon the sheer difficulty of actually simultaneously running
multiple methodologies (cf. Farmer et al. 2006). This has led some to go so
far as to argue that “using several different methods can actually increase
the chance of error” (Kelle 2005, p. 99), since overtaxed scholars will be more
haphazard in their work.
Note that another motivation for methodological purism would be the
conviction that one’s favoured method is simply epistemically superior, or,
at least, epistemically superior when applied to some particular class of prob-
lems. Of course, while that may motivate methodological purism, it is un-
likely by itself to persuade those of different methodological predilections.
Hence, although it may motivate many, one rarely finds the conviction ex-
pressed in so naked a form in the literature. That said, it is not difficult
to find works by partisans of qualitative versus quantitative methodology,
or vice versa, in which they argue for their preferred style of research (see
Bryman 1984 for a review and Tewksbury 2009 for a recent example). Hence
it is worth explicitly noting this source of support for methodological purism,
as sheer preference for one method over another is plausibly what motivates
many in their methodological purism. Against this, we shall argue that
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the recognition that one method is superior should not by itself motivate
methodological purism.
In order to respond to this scepticism about the merits of triangulation
we outline a formal model of methodological triangulation in §2. This model
is designed to be maximally generous to the opponent of methodological
triangulation. Within our model there are multiple methods being run si-
multaneously to ascertain which of several propositions ought to be believed.
We then show that under a variety of scenarios favourable to the purist, in-
cluding scenarios more pessimistic in their appraisal of rival methods than
any actual purists are likely to countenance, methodological triangulation
still provides a good guide to truth providing one exhibits what we call Du
Boisian diffidence, as discussed below. That is to say, there are reasons for
an observer of a process of inquiry who is not sure which method to trust to
none the less assent to the proposition which has been endorsed by multiple
methods. The formal tools we use for this investigation are borrowed from
voting theory, and more particularly the literature surrounding Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem (Grofman et al. 1983, List and Goodin 2001). We rely on some
existing results and prove some new ones. We conclude in §3 by suggesting
lines of future research.
There have long been practicing social scientists who have thought that
methodological pluralism was an exploitable resource. In perhaps the earli-
est example of a scholar advocating methodological triangulation (Wortham
2005), writing in the 1890s Du Bois claimed that pluralism could be exploited
to overcome the fact that “the methods of social research are at present so
liable to inaccuracies that the careful student discloses the results of indi-
vidual research with diffidence” (Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 2). We therefore
say that a scholar is in a state of Du Boisian diffidence just in case they are
not confident which of various competing methodologies to trust. Although
Du Bois did not outline why this should be, he thought that the use of multi-
ple methods to study the same problem “may perhaps have corrected to some
extent the errors of each” (Du Bois 1996 [1899], p. 3). He hence proceeded
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to deploy methodological triangulation in his own work. We take ourselves
to be providing the mathematical foundations for Du Bois’ insight.
Other social scientists have followed Du Bois in making use of method-
ological triangulation in their work (e.g., Farrall et al. 1997, Cunningham
et al. 2000, Mangan et al. 2004, Jack and Raturi 2006). Not only has tri-
angulation been applied by social scientists, but there has also been much
favourable explicit reflection on triangulation as a methodology in itself.
Indeed, the literature now contains a multitude of types of “methodologi-
cal triangulation”, each with their own rationale (for review see Thurmond
2001). Hence, although triangulation has been criticised in ways we men-
tioned above, we are certainly not the first to argue that triangulation “al-
lows researchers to be more confident of their results” (Jick 1979, p. 608).
Except in so far as they explicitly deny the ability of triangulation to pro-
vide additional confirmatory support for a hypothesis, we do not consider
our arguments in tension with these alternate accounts of the benefits of tri-
angulation. We are open to the possibility that there are additional benefits
to methodological triangulation.
The tradition of work closest to ours in defending methodological trian-
gulation is that which has implicitly or explicitly appealed to confirmation
theory. At least as far back as Hempel confirmation theorists have acknowl-
edged that “the confirmation of a hypothesis depends not only on the quan-
tity of the favorable evidence available, but also on its variety: the greater
the variety, the stronger the resulting support” (Hempel 1966, p. 34). Fur-
ther, while philosophers dispute the concept’s precise meaning, some scholars
who discuss Whewell’s notion of “consilience” interpret this in line with the
idea that triangulation increases confirmatory support (Laudan 1971, Fisch
1985, Snyder 2005; for application see Leung and van de Vijver 2008). More
recently, Fredericks and Miller (1988, p. 350) argue that Carnappian confir-
mation theory explains how it is that triangulation upon a proposition serves
to increase one’s rational degree of confidence in that proposition. Risjord
et al. (2001, 2002) have even argued in the other direction, using the phe-
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nomenon of methodological triangulation to support a coherentist theory of
confirmation. However, despite the attention paid to the relationship be-
tween methodological triangulation and confirmation, our literature search
did not reveal any formal demonstration that methodological triangulation
serves to increase degree of confirmation. The results from our model there-
fore fill that gap in the literature.
2 The Model
We will introduce our model by way of an example. Suppose we were in-
vestigating the effects of housing policy on quality of life in a given urban
locale. For simplicity’s sake we assume there are four possible answers –
Great, Good, Bad, Terrible. We also assume that one answer is in some
(epistemic) sense superior to the others (call this the “correct” answer). In
our example we will suppose the correct answer is Good.
Three purist scholars set out to investigate the matter – the ethnographer
convinced that the only way to address the issue is ethnographic participant
observation, the sociologist convinced that a well-structured survey analyzed
by sophisticated statistical techniques, and the economist putting their faith
in the construction and analysis of rational choice models of the policy and
its effects.
First suppose that each of these methods has some positive connection
with the correct answer. Say each method has, independently of the other
methods, a 1/3 probability of yielding the answer Good, and only a 2/9
probability each for each of the other three answers.
Now we introduce a final actor into our show, the triangulator, who runs
no investigation of her own, but adopts the strategy: pick whatever answer is
triangulated upon, otherwise guess between any of the answers selected by at
least one method. In this example, the triangulator has a 29/81 probability
of getting the answer Good. Since 29/81 > 1/3, the triangulator has a better
chance of settling on the right answer than the purists.
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It might be thought that this result is an artifact of the particular numbers
we chose. Theorem 1 shows this suspicion to be mistaken. In order to state
the theorem, we will need a little more notation.
Suppose there are m methods a1, . . . , am available to address a given
question. The question has n possible answers b1, . . . , bn, one of which is
“correct”. Without loss of generality, suppose the correct answer is b1.
Each method, independently from the others, yields upon application one
answer it endorses (we will call this the answer “picked” by that method). A
method picks answer bj with probability rj. The positive connection to the
correct answer is represented by the assumption that r1 > rj for all j 6= 1.
So any method is more likely to pick the correct answer than it is to pick
any given incorrect answer.
A purist picks a single method and always believes the answer picked by
that method to be the correct answer. By assumption, then, the purist’s
belief is correct with probability r1. A triangulator looks at the answers
picked by all the methods available to her, and believes the answer picked
by the greatest number of methods to be the correct one (if multiple answers
are tied for being picked the most times, she picks a random answer among
the tied ones to believe). Let pj denote the probability that the triangulator
ends up believing answer bj.
Theorem 1. p1 ≥ r1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 2. Moreover, p1 is increasing in m.
This is a slightly strengthened version of List and Goodin (2001, propo-
sition 1). A proof is available from the authors upon request.
So not only does a triangulator do better than a purist, a triangulator
with more methods available also does better than a triangulator with less
methods available. In fact, as the number of methods increases, it becomes
virtually certain that the triangulator will get it right: p1 → 1 as m → ∞
(List and Goodin 2001, proposition 2).
The above result arguably captures what Du Bois had in mind. Each
method yields some evidence. Perhaps this evidence is not particularly strong
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on its own, but taken together the various methods can support a conclusion
quite strongly. However, from the purist’s perspective it may seem that
our analysis is rigged: we assumed that each method has some probabilistic
connection to the correct answer, whereas in reality (according to the purist)
only the purist’s preferred method does. So let us now turn to that scenario.
As it turns out, suppose, ethnographic participant observation really is
The One True Method, sure to give the correct answer (that the effects of
housing policy are Good), and the other two methodologies are more or
less glorified guesswork (probability 1/4 of yielding each of the four possible
answers).
Note that “guesswork” is the weakest possible assumption we can make
about a method, as it entails that the results of this method provides no
information whatsoever. If we made the “weaker” assumption of a nega-
tive connection with the correct answer (probability less than 1/4 of yield-
ing the answer Good) the method actually becomes more useful: an “anti-
triangulator” could use such a method to determine which answers are likely
to be incorrect. Since no opponent of triangulation has proposed using meth-
ods to knock out potential answers we assume guesswork is what they have
in mind when they say other methods are bad.
In this case the triangulator has a 9/16 probability of settling on the
answer Good. She is doing worse than the ethnographer (who gets the correct
answer with probability 1) but better than the sociologist and the economist
(who get the correct answer with probability 1/4).
What should we conclude from this? Obviously the triangulator is not
doing as well as the ethnographer. So if we know that ethnography is The
One True Method there is no reason to use methodological triangulation.
But if we are in a case of Du Boisian diffidence things are different. Even
if we know that there is a true method and the other two are just guesswork,
it is good to be a triangulator: the triangulator gets it right 9 out of 16 times,
whereas guessing what the right method is and sticking with that one only
gets it right 8 out of those same 16 times (1 · 1/3 + 1/4 · 2/3 = 1/2).
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Here again one might worry that the result is a numerical artifact, but
once again we can assuage this worry. Consider the same setup as before,
except now there is a special m+1-st method (call it a0) which always picks
the correct answer (answer b1), while the other m methods pick any answer
with probability 1/n.
The purist chooses a method at random (this reflects Du Boisian diffi-
dence: the purist does not know which method is The One True Method), i.e.,
each method is chosen with probability 1/(m+ 1). Then the purist believes
whatever answer that method picks to be the correct one. The triangulator,
as before, believes whatever answer is picked by the most methods (random-
izing in case of ties). Let pj and qj denote the probabilities of believing
answer bj for the triangulator and the purist respectively.
Theorem 2. p1 ≥ q1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
This result and theorem 3 are proved in appendix A.
We believe the above scenario is the most favorable possible scenario for
the methodological purist (and thus showing that methodological triangula-
tion can be valuable in it is our strongest arguments in its favor), because it
assumes that the purist’s preferred method is as good as it could possibly be
and the other methods are as bad as they could possibly be. But it might
still be objected that it is unrealistic that The One True Method delivers the
correct answer with probability 1.
So now consider a case in which ethnography (The One True Method)
yields the answer Good with probability 1/3 (2/9 each for the other three
possible answers) while the other methods are random (1/4 for each answer).
In this case the triangulator gets the answer Good with probability 41/144.
The triangulator does worse than the ethnographer (41/144 < 1/3) but bet-
ter than the other two (1/4 < 41/144). Just as before, if a scientist is subject
to Du Boisian diffidence triangulation is the way to go. In particular, trian-
gulation does better than picking a method at random and being a purist
about that method (1/3 · 1/3 + 1/4 · 2/3 = 40/144 < 41/144).
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More generally, suppose that method a0 picks answer bj with probabil-
ity rj and assume that r1 > 1/n (so a0 favors b1 more than chance, although
another answer might be favored even more). As before, the other methods
pick randomly: any answer bj has a 1/n chance of being picked. pj and qj
are defined as above.
Theorem 3. p1 ≥ q1 for all n and m. The inequality is strict whenever
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
3 Conclusion
Some social scientists have attempted to exploit the fact of methodological
pluralism by claiming that where triangulation can be achieved this provides
more support for the point triangulated upon than any method considered
individually could. Though confirmation theorists seemed generally sym-
pathetic to the idea, and saw links between points of interest to them and
methodological triangulation, there had never been an explicit demonstra-
tion of this point. Further, other social scientists expressed scepticism about
the benefits of triangulation. Our model has vindicated individuals’ use of
methodological triangulation, and thus also the instincts of the confirmation
theorists. In line with Du Bois’ methodological advice, triangulation does
provide confirmatory support — and, in particular, it does so even if one is
not sure which of one’s available methods can actually be relied upon. Since
we were following Du Bois in this we take ourselves to have supplied under-
pinnings for what is actually at least some of the social scientific rationale
for methodological triangulation. As Du Bois foresaw, a significant benefit of
triangulation is that it allows researchers who do not know precisely which
method to trust to more effectively converge on the truth by favouring those
results which have been triangulated upon.
The net effect of our arguments is to give those scholars who feel some
degree of Du Boisian diffidence about the available methods in the social
sciences reason to be happy about the fact of methodological pluralism. The
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various epistemological and methodological battles which have wracked the
social sciences need not be resolved before one can proceed. Nor need this
be accepted as an unfortunate brute fact of life, acquiesced to only out of
resignation at the short span of a human lifetime and the intractability of
our differences. Rather, since the various proponents of various methods
have made reasonable points, none of which can be simply dismissed, we find
that the tolerance of methodological pluralism does the diffident individual
benefit, by allowing them to exploit triangulation in order to better arrive
at the truth. We accept that to those who feel no degree of diffidence, our
arguments may be less moving. In particular, to those who feel that the one
true method in the social sciences should be qualitative, these arguments
may all seem question begging. Perhaps so. But in our experience some
degree of Du Boisian diffidence is the typical state of the scholar, and thus
we take our results to be of interest to a broad range of people.
There is still, however, plenty of work left to be done, and we end
by suggesting two additional lines of research. First, one source of anti-
confirmationist scepticism we have not addressed is the worry that there is
widespread correlated error. Some argument against this possibility seems
to be necessary before methodological triangulation can be taken to provide
methodological support. We hope that now there is formal apparatus avail-
able to rigorously study the benefits of methodological triangulation, it is
possible to explore the circumstances in which correlated error will undo the
advantages of triangulation.
Second, our arguments were markedly about the benefits of methodolog-
ical triangulation for the diffident individual. However, work in social epis-
temology implies that what may be a rational strategy for an individual
inquirer to adopt may be disadvantageous for the community as a whole if
generally adopted (Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011). Hence, while our model vindi-
cates individuals in exploiting methodological triangulation, it is not yet an
argument in favour of methodological triangulation – and, thus, the fact of
methodological pluralism – being to the benefit of science as a whole. Future
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work in this field could thus profitably explore a game theoretic, or otherwise
social, model of the operation of methodological triangulation. In either case,
we hope the work we have done here shall provide a useful foundation for
further work in the field.
A Proofs
For ease of exposition, we prove our results in the terminology of voting
theory. The methods are the voters and the possible answers to the research
question are the candidates.
Consider elections of the following form: there are n candidates b1, . . . , bn,
and m + 1 voters a1, . . . , am, and a0 (the reason we single out a0 will be
explained shortly). Formally, we can describe a vote as a function v :
{a1, . . . , am, a0} → {b1, . . . , bn}. Each vote v induces a probability measure
µv on the set of candidates defined as follows:
• µv(bk) = 1 iff |v−1(bk)| > |v−1(bj)| whenever j 6= k, i.e. candidate bk
receives the most votes outright.
• µv(bk) = 1/` iff |v−1(bk)| ≥ |v−1(bj)| for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and there are
` candidates, including bk, who receive the maximum number of votes.
Additionally, we may suppose that ν is a probability measure on the space
X of all possible votes. We define the overall probability pk that bk wins to
be the quantity:
∫
X
µv(bk)dν =
∑
v∈X
µv(bk)ν(v)
We will consider the following two procedures for choosing a candidate
using a vote:
1. Choose candidate bk with probability pk (i.e., choose the winner of the
vote). This is the triangulator’s procedure.
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2. Choose a voter y ∈ {a1, . . . , am, a0} randomly and uniformly, then
choose the candidate chosen by voter y, i.e., choose candidate bk with
probability
∫
X δ(bk, v(y))dν =
∑
v∈X δ(bk, v(y))ν(v). This is the purist’s
procedure.
Here δ(a, b) = 1 if a = b and δ(a, b) = 0 otherwise. We see that in
procedure 2, we hire candidate bk with probability qk defined as follows:
qk =
1
m+ 1
∑
0≤i≤m
∑
v∈X
δ(bk, v(ai))ν(v)
Lemma 4. Let Av be the random variable |v−1(b1)|. Then q1 = E(Av)/(m+
1).
Proof. For any fixed v ∈ X, we have
|v−1(b1)| =
∑
0≤i≤m
δ(b1, v(ai)).
It follows that
E(Av) =
∑
v∈X
∑
0≤i≤m
δ(b1, ai)ν(v).
We now focus on the special case where a0 votes for b1 and a1, . . . , am
vote randomly, uniformly, and independently. Set Y = {v ∈ X : v(a0) = b1}.
Lemma 5. Let Bv be the random variable max(|v−1(bj)| : 1 ≤ j ≤ n).
Additionally, assume that ν is supported on Y and uniform on Y . Then
p1 = E(Bv)/(m+ 1).
Proof. Fix a vote v. Notice first that
Bv =
∑
0≤i≤m
µv(v(ai)).
Now the assumption that ν is uniform is equivalent to asserting that
voter a0 votes for b1 while voters a1, . . . , ak each pick a candidate randomly,
uniformly, and independently. In particular, we have for any 0 ≤ i ≤ m that
13
p1 =
∑
v∈Y
µv(v(a0))ν(v) =
∑
v∈Y
µv(v(ai))ν(v).
Remark. Note that E(Bv) is the same for any ν where voters a1, . . . , am vote
randomly, uniformly, and independently; we will use this later to consider
changing the manner in which a0 votes.
Theorem 2. If ν is supported on Y and uniform on Y , then p1 ≥ q1. The
inequality is strict whenever m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
Proof. The first assertion is immediate from Lemmas 4 and 5 as Bv ≥ Av. If
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, there is some v ∈ Y with Bv > Av (any vote where there
is some outright winner who is not b1 works).
Remark. Notice that in the setting of Theorem 2, we have q1 = (m +
n)/(n(m + 1)). In particular, for any ν in which a1, . . . , am vote randomly,
uniformly, and independently, we have E(Bv) ≥ (m + n)/n, with strict in-
equality for m,n ≥ 2. We will use this in the proof of Theorem 3.
We now prove the same result for ν in which a0 votes for bi with proba-
bility ri, where r1 > 1/n.
Theorem 3. Suppose ν is a measure where a1, . . . , am vote randomly, uni-
formly, and independently (and independently of a0), and suppose a0 votes
for bi with probability ri, where r1 > 1/n. Then p1 ≥ q1, with strict inequality
whenever m,n ≥ 2.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 5 (and in the remark after), we saw that the
probability that a0 votes for the winner of v is exactly E(Bv)/(m + 1). So
to compute p1 in terms of E(Bv), we need to consider two cases: if a0 does
vote for b1, we want to count the probability that a0 voted for the winner,
whereas if a0 votes for b2, . . . , bn, we want to count the probability that a0
does not vote for the winner and that b1 did in fact win. We see that:
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p1 = r1
(
E(Bv)
m+ 1
)
+ (1− r1)
(
m+ 1− E(Bv)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
= r1
(
E(Bv)(n− 1)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
+ (1− r1)
(
m+ 1− E(Bv)
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
)
= (1− r1)(m+ 1) + E(Bv)(r1n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)
≥ (1− r1)(m+ 1)n+ (m+ n)(r1n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)n
= (m+ r1n)(n− 1)(m+ 1)(n− 1)n
Now q1 is just given by Lemma 4:
q1 = E(Av)/(m+ 1)
= m+ r1n
n(m+ 1)
References
Norman W. H. Blaikie. A critique of the use of triangulation in social re-
search. Quality and Quantity, 25(2):115–136, 1991. ISSN 0033-5177. doi:
10.1007/BF00145701. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00145701.
Alan Bryman. The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: A
question of method or epistemology? The British Journal of Sociology, 35
(1):75–92, 1984. ISSN 00071315. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
590553.
Lawrence Cunningham, Clifford Young, and Moonkyu Lee. Methodological
triangulation in measuring public transportation service quality. Trans-
portation Journal, 40(1):35–47, 2000. ISSN 00411612. URL http://www.
jstor.org/stable/20713444.
15
W. E. B. Du Bois. The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996 [1899].
Tracy Farmer, Kerry Robinson, Susan J. Elliott, and John Eyles. Devel-
oping and implementing a triangulation protocol for qualitative health
research. Qualitative Health Research, 16(3):377–394, 2006. doi: 10.1177/
1049732305285708. URL http://qhr.sagepub.com/content/16/3/377.
abstract.
Stephen Farrall, Jon Bannister, Jason Ditton, and Elizabeth Gilchrist. Ques-
tioning the measurement of the ‘fear of crime’: Findings from a ma-
jor methodological study. British Journal of Criminology, 37(4):658–
679, 1997. URL http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/37/4/658.
abstract.
Menachem Fisch. Whewell’s consilience of inductions—an evaluation. Phi-
losophy of Science, 52(2):239–255, 1985. ISSN 00318248. URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/187509.
Marcel Fredericks and Steven Miller. Some notes on confirming hypotheses in
qualitative research: An application. Social Epistemology, 2(4):345–352,
1988. doi: 10.1080/02691728808578503. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/02691728808578503.
Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen, and Scott L. Feld. Thirteen theorems in
search of the truth. Theory and Decision, 15(3):261–278, 1983. ISSN 0040-
5833. doi: 10.1007/BF00125672. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
BF00125672.
Carl G. Hempel. Philosophy of Natural Science. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1966.
Eric P. Jack and Amitabh S. Raturi. Lessons learned from methodological
triangulation in management research. Management Research News, 29
16
(6):345–357, 2006. doi: 10.1108/01409170610683833. URL http://www.
emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/01409170610683833.
Todd D. Jick. Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation
in action. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24(4):602–611, 1979. ISSN
00018392. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2392366.
Udo Kelle. Sociological explanations between micro and macro and the inte-
gration of qualitative and quantitative methods. Historical Social Research
/ Historische Sozialforschung, 30(1 (111)):95–117, 2005. ISSN 01726404.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/20762014.
Larry Laudan. William Whewell on the consilience of inductions. The
Monist, 55(3):368–391, 1971. ISSN 00269662. URL http://www.jstor.
org/stable/27902225.
Kwok Leung and Fons J. R. van de Vijver. Strategies for strengthening causal
inferences in cross cultural research: The consilience approach. Interna-
tional Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 8(2):145–169, 2008. doi:
10.1177/1470595808091788. URL http://ccm.sagepub.com/content/8/
2/145.abstract.
Christin List and Robert E. Goodin. Epistemic democracy: Generalizing
the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3):277–
306, 2001. ISSN 1467-9760. doi: 10.1111/1467-9760.00128. URL http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00128.
John Mangan, Chandra Lalwani, and Bernard Gardner. Combining quan-
titative and qualitative methodologies in logistics research. International
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 34(7):565–578,
2004. doi: 10.1108/09600030410552258. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1108/09600030410552258.
Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin J. S. Zollman, and David Danks. The inde-
pendence thesis: When individual and social epistemology diverge. Phi-
17
losophy of Science, 78(4):653–677, 2011. ISSN 00318248. URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/661777.
Phil McEvoy and David Richards. A critical realist rationale for using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Journal of Research
in Nursing, 11(1):66–78, 2006. doi: 10.1177/1744987106060192. URL
http://jrn.sagepub.com/content/11/1/66.abstract.
Mark W. Risjord, Margaret F. Moloney, and Sandra B. Dunbar. Method-
ological triangulation in nursing research. Philosophy of the Social Sci-
ences, 31(1):40–59, 2001. doi: 10.1177/004839310103100103. URL http:
//pos.sagepub.com/content/31/1/40.abstract.
Mark W. Risjord, Sandra B. Dunbar, and Margaret F. Moloney. A new
foundation for methodological triangulation. Journal of Nursing Scholar-
ship, 34(3):269–275, 2002. ISSN 1547-5069. doi: 10.1111/j.1547-5069.2002.
00269.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1547-5069.2002.00269.
x.
Julius Sim and Keith Sharp. A critical appraisal of the role of triangulation
in nursing research. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 35(1–2):23–
31, 1998. ISSN 0020-7489. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0020-7489(98)
00014-5. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0020748998000145.
Laura J. Snyder. Consilience, confirmation and realism. In Peter Achin-
stein, editor, Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications,
chapter 7, pages 129–149. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
2005.
Richard Tewksbury. Qualitative versus quantitative methods: Understand-
ing why qualitative methods are superior for criminology and criminal
justice. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, 1(1):38–
58, 2009. ISSN 21668094. URL http://search.ebscohost.com/login.
aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=57233244&site=ehost-live.
18
Veronica A. Thurmond. The point of triangulation. Journal of Nursing Schol-
arship, 33(3):253–258, 2001. ISSN 1547-5069. doi: 10.1111/j.1547-5069.
2001.00253.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1547-5069.2001.
00253.x.
Robert A. Wortham. Du Bois and the sociology of religion: Rediscovering
a founding figure. Sociological Inquiry, 75(4):433–452, 2005. ISSN 1475-
682X. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-682X.2005.00131.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1475-682X.2005.00131.x.
19
